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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No: 06-4980
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DEDRIC DYSHON HAYES
a/k/a Dereke
DEDRIC DYSHON HAYES,
Appellant
_______________
Appeal from United District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00062)
District Judge: Hon. Yvette Kane
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 8, 2007
Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 3, 2007)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Dedric Hayes pleaded guilty to a Superseding Information charging him with the
unlawful distribution of an undetermined quantity of crack cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841. The District Court imposed a sentence of 176 months imprisonment. We
vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). On remand, the District Court imposed the same sentence,
and Hayes appeals.
Hayes raises three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the sentence imposed
by the District Court was unreasonable. Second, Hayes argues that the District Court
failed to adequately consider the crack cocaine to powder cocaine sentencing disparity.
Finally, Hayes argues that the District Court erred by rejecting his objection to the drug
amount calculation without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that follow, we will
affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.
I.
Hayes pleaded guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to a Superseding
Information charging him with the unlawful distribution of an undetermined quantity of
crack cocaine. The practical effect of pleading to distribution of an undetermined
quantity was to limit Hayes’s exposure to a maximum sentence of 20 years, pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), rather than a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and a
mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated the quantity of drugs for
which Hayes was responsible to be approximately 683 grams of crack cocaine, which was
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based on witness estimates of the quantity of crack cocaine sold by Hayes. Hayes
objected to the drug amount calculation but withdrew his objection prior to sentencing.
Because Hayes cooperated with government agents by giving them information
regarding, inter alia, Hassan Thomas’s crack cocaine distribution, the government moved
for a 25% downward departure for substantial assistance, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
The District Court granted the government’s motion and imposed a sentence of 176
months, which reflected a 25% reduction from the low end of the guideline imprisonment
range of 235-240 months. Hayes appealed his sentence, and we vacated and remanded
the matter to the District Court for re-sentencing in light of Booker.
Prior to re-sentencing, the government filed a motion seeking leave to withdraw its
previous request for a guideline departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, because two
months after Hayes was sentenced, he testified at Thomas’s sentencing hearing that he
had lied to government agents about Thomas being involved in crack cocaine distribution.
Also prior to re-sentencing, Hayes filed an objection to the drug amount calculation that
was originally used to establish his guideline offense level, and asked the Court to depart
from the guideline range based upon the disparity between the guidelines for crack
cocaine and powder cocaine.
II.
Hayes first argues that the District Court’s sentence was unreasonable because the
Court failed to consider that he (1) is only twenty-five years old; (2) committed no acts of
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violence during any of his drug transactions; (3) has made “positive efforts” in prison;
and (4) should be involved in his son’s life. The government responds that the Court
considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors prior to imposing the sentence.1
The District Court stated the following prior to imposing the sentence:
Alright. Counsel, I have struggled with this case. I think the guidelines
are very high, but I think that Mr. Hayes has been given all due
consideration in the government’s motion for downward departure. I
think if the government had it their way of course there would not be a
motion for downward departure on the record at this point, but I find
that there is. At the time when we were here last time, I believe I
commented that I thought 25% was a substantial reduction, given the
level of the defendant’s cooperation. I think if I revisit that issue I
would feel even more certain that that were the case, but I’m not going
to revisit that issue. I think it’s appropriate as I’ve indicated before. So
really I think based on all of the circumstances, the defendant’s
background, his criminal conduct, his level of involvement in this as
compared to the other defendants, I think the original sentence of 176
months was a reasonable one and that is what I will impose now.
(App. 125-26.)
Even though the District Court did not explicitly state that it had considered all of the
relevant § 3553(a) factors, the Court specifically noted that it had considered “all of the
circumstances” prior to imposing the sentence, and it appears from the history of the case
that the Court did. We therefore find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
and the sentence imposed was reasonable.

1

The government also argues that we do not have jurisdiction to hear Hayes’s challenge
because the sentence of 176 months was imposed as the result of a departure granted
pursuant to a 5K1.1 motion for reduction. We are not persuaded by this argument.
4

III.
Next, Hayes argues that the District Court failed to adequately consider the crack
cocaine to powder cocaine sentencing disparity. The record is clear, however, that the
Court acknowledged that it had the authority to consider the disparity, but nevertheless
chose not to reduce Hayes’s sentence. Specifically, the Court stated that it was “entitled”
to consider the disparity “as a 3553(a) factor...but I don’t find under the circumstances
here that it warrants a reduction from the guideline range....” (App. at 133-34.)
IV.
Finally, Hayes argues that the District Court erred by rejecting his objection to the
drug amount calculation without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Hayes’s position is
that the remand of this case for re-sentencing in light of Booker “opened up the ability for
the sentencing court to consider Hayes’s calculation of drug amounts.” (Appellant’s Br. at
18.) The District Court believed that determining the drug amount on remand was outside
the scope of this Court’s mandate for re-sentencing, and ruled that it would not hear
evidence of drug quantities during the re-sentencing hearing.
Hayes withdrew his objection to the government’s drug amount calculation prior to
his first sentencing hearing, and he cannot now be heard to challenge that calculation.
When we vacated and remanded for re-sentencing, we did so in light of Booker, not on
the basis of an error in the drug amount calculation. Therefore, the District Court did not
err by refusing to allow Hayes to reinstate his objection to the drug amount calculation.
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V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of sentence will be affirmed.
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